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Significant International 
Environmental Law Cases: 2016-17 
 
 
James Harrison* 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This review of significant international environmental cases covers the period 
from May 2016 to May 2017. It focuses on those cases in which courts and 
tribunals have made a significant contribution to the development of 
international environmental law by interpreting relevant treaties or making 
pronouncements on the content of customary international law in the field of 
environmental protection. The consensual nature of international litigation 
means that such cases are infrequent. This year, for the first time in a number of 
years, there were no judgments by the International Court of Justice or the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on environmental matters, although 
some disputes are pending.1  The cases that have been decided in the past twelve 
months rather stem from specialist courts and tribunals, which are granted 
compulsory jurisdiction over dispute under particular treaties. Whilst the 
treaties being applied in these cases are primarily concerned with the promotion 
of other social (human rights) or economic (trade and investment) values, the 
judgments, decisions or awards demonstrate that these instruments can be 
interpreted in a way to improve or impede environmental protection. Therefore 
environmental lawyers need to pay close attention to developments in these 
fields, as they will influence the extent to which states may (or must) take 
measures to protect the environment.  
 
2. Investment Protection and the Environment 
 
International investment law continues to raise disputes involving challenges to 
state measures that are alleged to have caused harm to foreign investors in 
violation of international rules on the protection of foreign investment. 
The case of Windstream Energy v Canada2 is one of the more interesting 
investment disputes in recent years concerning environmental issues because it 
directly raises the question of whether a state can rely upon the precautionary 
approach/principle as a means for justifying interference with foreign 
investment projects.  Windstream Energy was an American company, which 
established a special purpose vehicle incorporated in Ontario in order to carry 
                                                        
* Senior Lecturer in International Law, University of Edinburgh School of Law.  Email: 
james.harrison@ed.ac.uk.  
1 See eg Dispute over the Status and Use of the Waters of the Silala (Chile v Bolivia), pending before 
the International Court of Justice, in which Chile alleges, inter alia, that Bolivia has failed to 
conduct environmental impact assessment of certain activities which could have transboundary 
effects on the Silala River; see the Chilean Application instituting Proceedings (6 June 2016). 
2 Windstream Energy v Canada, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Award of the Tribunal (27 September 
2016). 
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out an offshore wind energy project. The project proposal was made in response 
to an announcement by the provincial authorities, highlighting opportunities for 
investments in renewable energy.  Windstream Energy applied for a Feed-In 
Tariff (FIT) contract for, inter alia, the Wolfe Island Shoals project, an offshore 
wind facility consisting of approximately 100 wind turbines in Lake Ontario 
capable of generating 300 MW of electricity.  Windstream Energy’s application 
was approved in May 2010 and the contract was signed in August 2010.  The FIT 
provided a 20-year fixed price to be paid by the Ontario Power Authority for 
energy from renewable sources.  The company provided a letter of credit of 6 
million Canadian dollars to support its contract.  According to the contract, 
Windstream Energy was required to bring its facility into commercial operation 
by 4 May 2015.  Unfortunately, the project would run into difficulties due to 
certain additional obstacles required by the regulatory process and it is these 
problems that subsequently led to Windstream Energy commencing arbitral 
proceedings under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA).  
 
As well as obtaining a FIT contract, Windstream Energy also had to obtain, inter 
alia, a Renewable Energy Approval (REA), which would be granted subject to the 
project meeting certain requirements imposed by domestic regulations.  At the 
time when Windstream Energy entered into its FIT contract, the domestic 
regulations relating to offshore wind had not yet been adopted.  Work on 
developing these regulations took place over the summer of 2010, when several 
technical workshops were held.  It was at this time that a public consultation on 
offshore wind also took place, revealing significant opposition to such projects 
due to environmental concerns.  In October 2010, the Ministry of Natural 
Resources informed Windstream Energy that the government’s offshore wind 
policy was ‘still outstanding’ and the project would not be able to advance until 
further progress had been made.  Two months later, Windstream Energy 
invoked the force majeure clause of its FIT contract as a means of suspending the 
contract until the domestic regulatory framework had been completed and it 
was able to proceed with the project. In February 2011, the government of 
Ontario announced that it would not be moving forward with offshore wind until 
further scientific evidence concerning the environmental impact of offshore 
turbines could be gathered.  According to officials from the Ministry of the 
Environment, they did not have enough information to draft a REA regulation for 
offshore wind and there was ‘too much uncertainty for us to go forward on that 
now…’3 Following this announcement, Windstream Energy entered into 
negotiations about what to do about their FIT contract, but no settlement was 
reached.   
 
When Windstream Energy brought its claim under the investment protection 
provisions of the NAFTA in December 2012, the FIT contract was still in force, 
but there was still no move by the government of Ontario to put into place the 
regulations that would allow Windstream Energy to commence its project at 
Wolfe Island Shoals.  Thus, in its pleadings, Windstream Energy argued that the 
actions of the provincial government constituted a breach of Canada’s 
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obligations under NAFTA, including, inter alia, a breach of Article 1110 on 
expropriation and Article 1105 on fair and equitable treatment. In its defence, 
Canada argued that ‘the decision to defer offshore wind projects was grounded 
in the precautionary principle’4 and it denied that there had been any violation of 
its international obligations.  The award on the merits of the dispute was handed 
down by an arbitral tribunal in September 2016. 
 
On the question of expropriation, the Tribunal followed the established 
jurisprudence by saying that it was first necessary to determine whether the 
investor has been substantially deprived of the value of its investment.  The 
Tribunal noted that, on the facts, the claimant still had its FIT contract and 
therefore, at most, the claimant had been deprived of the opportunity to develop 
the project.  Moreover, the security offered by the claimant was still in place and 
it had not been taken by the provincial authorities. In light of this continuing 
contractual relationship, the Tribunal emphasised that it was open to the parties 
to re-negotiate the FIT contract to take into account the moratorium introduced 
by Ontario. At the same time, under the FIT contract, if the date for commercial 
operation was delayed by 24 months by reason of force majeure, the claimant 
would have the right to unilaterally terminate the contract and the security 
would be returned.  In these circumstances, the Tribunal held that no 
expropriation of the investment could be considered to have taken place.5    
 
The question of fair and equitable treatment is far more controversial and it has 
raised significant disagreements in the case law to date as to how the standard 
should be interpreted.6 The Tribunal noted this divergence of opinion in its 
award and it also acknowledged the difficulties in determining this issue.  In this 
respect, the Tribunal held that:  
 
[I]n principle, the content of a rule of customary international law such as 
the minimum standard of treatment can best be determined based upon 
evidence of actual State practice established custom that also shows that 
the States have accepted such practice as law (opinio juris). However, the 
Tribunal notes that neither Party has produced such evidence in this 
arbitration. In the circumstances, the Tribunal must rely on other, 
indirect, evidence in order to ascertain the content of the customary 
minimum standard of treatment … Such indirect evidence includes, in the 
Tribunal’s view, decisions taken by other NAFTA tribunals that 
specifically address the issue of interpretation and application under 
Article 1105(1) of NAFTA, as well as relevant legal scholarship.7 
 
In practice, the Tribunal relied upon the previous jurisprudence in order to 
justify its position that ‘just as the proof of the pudding is in the eating (and not 
in its description), the ultimate test of correctness of an interpretation is not in 
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7 [351] 
 4 
its description in other words, but in its application to the facts.’8  By adopting 
this approach, the Tribunal avoided taking any view on whether or not the 
protection of legitimate expectations is inherent in the requirement of fair and 
equitable treatment. Nor did the Tribunal say much at all about the precise 
threshold of a violation.  Indeed, it is not apparent that the Tribunal gave any 
more specific content to the standard than determining whether or not the 
conduct of the provincial authorities could be considered as ‘fair’ and ‘equitable.’ 
Nevertheless, the actual application of the standard to the facts does reveal some 
interesting points about the limits of governmental authority on environmental 
issues and how far the precautionary approach/principle may be used to justify 
interference with foreign investors. 
 
In the first place, the Tribunal accepted that the government’s evolving policy 
was ‘at least in part driven by a genuine policy concern that there was not 
sufficient scientific support for establishing an appropriate setback, or exclusion 
zone, for offshore wind projects.’9 Furthermore, the Tribunal accepted that 
whilst there had been public opposition to the development of offshore wind, 
this had not been the predominant reason for the moratorium.10  This would 
seem to support the notion that the precautionary approach/principle is a 
justifiable defence for governmental action that interferes with foreign 
investments.  However, it is important to note that the Tribunal goes on to say 
that the action by Ontario following the announcement of the moratorium did 
amount to a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard because ‘the 
Government on the whole did relatively little to address the scientific 
uncertainty surrounding offshore wind that it had relied upon as the main 
publicly cited reason for the moratorium.’11 This finding would seem to suggest 
that the precautionary approach/principle would support temporary 
interference with investments, but that states have an obligation to take some 
action to fill the gaps in scientific certainty.  The Award does not tell us much 
about how much states must do in this context, as the Tribunal simply noted that 
many of the research plans announced by Ontario were not carried out and there 
had been no further development of the regulatory framework.   
 
Another major factor in the finding of the Tribunal was the failure of the 
authorities to address the contractual limbo in which Windstream Energy found 
itself after the imposition of the moratorium.  On this basis, Canada was held to 
be in violation of Article 1105 and Windstream Energy was awarded 25,182,900 
Canadian dollars in compensation. 
 
Most investment disputes with an environmental element, such as the one 
considered above, are concerned with challenges to environmental rules 
adopted by the host state in a manner that has negatively affected a foreign 
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claimed to have scientific concerns for cancelling licences but have been found to have been 
acting in order to assuage public concerns; see eg Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v Mexico, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(A)/00/2, Award of the Tribunal (29 May 2003), [164]. 
11 [378]. 
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investor. Allard v Barbados12 is unusual insofar as the investor was claiming that 
the failure of the host state to enforce its environmental rules and to ensure the 
protection of a wetland area on and adjacent to his property had undermined his 
investment in an eco-tourism attraction.  The investor, Mr Allard, was a Canadian 
citizen, who had established the Graeme Hall Bird Sanctuary Inc in 1996, 
following which he purchased 34.25 acres of land in the Graeme Hall Swamp on 
the south coast of Barbados.  The land included a forest of red and white 
mangroves, as well as a lake and ponds, which were connected to the ocean by a 
canal.  The connection between the canal and the ocean was regulated by a sluice 
gate operated by the government.  Mr Allard claimed that the government’s 
failure to operate the sluice gate in accordance with agreed procedures, as well 
as other alleged failures to enforce environmental laws, led to the gradual 
deterioration of the environmental quality of his land, forcing him to cease all 
operations at the sanctuary in March 2009, with the exception of the running of a 
roadside café.    In May 2010, Mr Allard brought claims under the 1996 Canada-
Barbados Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, alleging a violation of Article II(2)(a) on fair and equitable 
treatment, Article II(2)(b) on full protection and security, and Article VIII on 
expropriation.  All claims by the investor ultimately failed and he was ordered to 
pay 2.5 million US dollars in costs to the Barbadian government.  Nevertheless, 
the arbitral award offers some interesting observations about the use of 
evidence in environmental related claims, as well as the scope of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard and the full protection and security standard in the 
context of environmental protection. 
 
The main reason for the investor losing his suit was the failure to demonstrate 
that there had been any environmental degradation caused by the government of 
Barbados during the relevant period.  Both sides had presented conflicting 
evidence on this point and therefore how the Tribunal reached its conclusion is 
itself of interest.  According to the Tribunal, ‘to establish loss the [c]laimant first 
must establish that there was a degradation of the environment at the Sanctuary 
sufficient to render operating the [s]anctuary as an ecotourism attraction 
impossible or financially unsustainable.’13 The Tribunal emphasised that this 
was ‘an objective enquiry’14 and that the burden of proof was on the [c]laimant 
to demonstrate that such a degradation had occurred.15   
 
Moreover, it was necessary to prove that such degradation had happened 
between the initial establishment of the sanctuary in 1996 and the closure of the 
enterprise in 2009. Both sides had presented environmental experts, who put 
forward different hypotheses as to the environmental state of the wetland and 
the causes of any degradation. In addition, the Tribunal took into account a 
number of other sources presented by the parties, including an undergraduate 
marine biology thesis, a study carried out by scientists at McGill University, and a 
water monitoring programme carried out by the University of the West Indies.  
In construing this information, the Tribunal was careful to ensure that it was 
                                                        
12 Peter A Allard v Barbados, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Award of the Tribunal (27 June 2016). 
13 [84]. 
14 [84]. 
15 eg [110]. 
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making valid comparisons between data collected at similar times of year and 
according to equivalent methodologies.  This was particularly important given 
that it was accepted by both parties to the litigation that there were seasonal 
variations in water quality, which was one of the main indicators employed by 
the Tribunal to determine whether there had been degradation of the aquatic 
environment. Overall, the Tribunal was not convinced by the evidence that had 
been presented and it held that ‘the [c]laimant falls short of establishing material 
deterioration during the [r]elevant [p]eriod, let alone to the extent that would be 
apparent to one-time visitors.’16  The Tribunal went on to say that even if it 
assumed that there was evidence of decline in environmental quality, such 
events could not be attributed to the actions of the government of Barbados. The 
main issue here was whether the government had mismanaged the sluice gate 
that connected the lake in the sanctuary with the ocean. It was accepted that this 
sluice gate had been un-operational for a prolonged period of time and the 
investor had claimed that this state of affairs had caused the alleged reduced 
salinity of the swamp. However, the Tribunal also agreed that the sluice gate had 
often been used to drain excess water from the swamp, rather than to ensure 
water exchange between the swamp and the sea.  Moreover, the Tribunal also 
accepted that the sluice gate was not necessarily the only means through which 
salty water could enter the swamp, as this could also occur through subsurface 
water exchange.  Thus, the claimant failed to prove the necessary causal link. 
 
Despite finding that there was no evidence of environmental degradation, the 
Tribunal nevertheless went on to consider the legal arguments presented by the 
parties and whether the claims advanced by the investor were valid in principle. 
The Tribunal dismissed the expropriation claims with little hesitation, noting the 
investor still operated a roadside café on his land and therefore it could not be 
claimed that he had been substantially deprived of his business. For present 
purposes, the Tribunal’s comments in relation to the fair and equitable treatment 
standard and the full protection and security standard are worthy of greater 
attention. 
 
In Allard, the Tribunal took the view that the fair and equitable treatment 
standard included a duty to protect the legitimate expectations of an investor, 
whether or not the standard was construed as an autonomous treaty standard or 
a reflection of the international minimum standard.17  Nevertheless, it was 
necessary for the claimant to demonstrate that such expectations had arisen in 
practice.  The claimant had argued that he had legitimate expectations that the 
government would take measures to protect the swamp where his sanctuary 
was located. Such expectations were based upon the 1986 Development Plan 
adopted by Barbados for the relevant area, as well as correspondence and 
statements from the government.  Mr Allard also claimed that his expectations 
were confirmed and reinforced by Barbados’ environmental treaty obligations 
under the Convention on Biological Diversity18 and the Ramsar Convention on 
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18 Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted 22 June 1992, entered into force 
29 December 1993, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1760, p. 9. 
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Wetlands of International Importance.19  The Tribunal considered each of these 
arguments in turn.  In terms of the 1986 Development Plan, the Tribunal 
suggested that this document could not readily generate legitimate expectations, 
noting that ‘as a matter of general approach, such planning regulations of an 
administrative nature are not shielded from subsequent changes under domestic 
law.’20  The environmental management plan developed by the investor, but 
approved by the government as part of the planning process, could also not be 
considered to amount to anything more than entitling the investor to expect that 
he could proceed with the project without objection from the government on 
environmental grounds and the inclusion of provisions on the operation of the 
sluice gate in the management plan did not constitute a representation by which 
the state could be bound. Nor did any of the correspondence relied upon by the 
investor point to an express commitment that the 1986 Plan would not be 
amended.  Similarly, assurances given by the former Deputy Prime Minister at a 
meeting with the investor in November 1996 were ‘insufficiently specific to give 
rise to legitimate expectations.’21  Indeed, even if representations had been made 
that were capable of generating legitimate expectations, the Tribunal held that 
there was no evidence that the investor had relied upon them in his decision to 
make the investment, which came before any of the alleged representations were 
made. Given these negative findings, the Tribunal did not consider it necessary to 
deal with the argument that Barbados’ treaty obligations confirmed the 
legitimacy of the investor’s expectations.   
 
Claims based upon the full protection and security standard are less common 
and therefore it is significant that the Tribunal appears to suggest that failure to 
take steps to protect the environment could in principle amount to a violation of 
this standard. At the same time, the Tribunal emphasised that the obligation is 
‘not one of strict liability but of “due diligence” or “reasonable case”’22 and ‘a host 
State is not required to take any specific steps that an investor asks of it.’23  In 
another interesting comment on the content of this standard, the Tribunal 
suggested that ‘consideration of a host State’s international obligations may well 
be relevant in the application of the standard to particular circumstances.’24  This 
is a welcome recognition of the need for a mutually supportive interpretation of 
investment treaties and multilateral environmental agreements, although the full 
ramifications of this statement are not clear as the Tribunal determined that 
there was no breach of the due diligence standard and it did not consider it 
necessary to look at any specific environmental treaty obligations in reaching its 
conclusions. Nevertheless, the award leaves the door open for this argument to 
be raised again in the future, if an investor brings a similar claim. 
 
 
                                                        
19 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, adopted on 2 February 
1971, entered into force on 21 December 1975, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 
996, p. 246. 
20 [200]. 
21 [204]. 
22 [243]. 
23 [244]. 
24 [244]. 
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3. Trade and the Environment 
 
The case of India – Certain Measures relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules25 is 
the latest challenge to domestic measures for the promotion of renewable energy 
generation under the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). India had 
launched the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission in 2010 with a view to 
establishing India as a global leader in solar energy ‘by creating the policy 
conditions for its diffusion across the country as quickly as possible.’26  The 
scheme involved the granting of power purchase agreements, under which the 
government committed to purchasing power produced through solar energy at a 
guaranteed rate for a 25-year term.  The agreements, however, included a 
domestic content requirement clause. The precise substance of the clause 
differed depending on the nature of the technology being used to generate 
electricity, but they all essentially made it compulsory for some form of 
component manufactured in India to be used in the generating system. It was 
this element of the scheme that was challenged by the United States (US) as a 
violation of Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
because it discriminated against foreign products. The US also claimed that the 
measure breached the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures. The 
complaints were upheld by a WTO panel in February 2016, but the result was 
appealed by India. The WTO Appellate Body handed down its decision in 
September 2016, confirming the finding of the original panel, whilst offering 
some interesting observations on the legal arguments raised in the case. 
 
In many respects, the dispute resembles a previous claim against a Canadian 
scheme to promote renewable energy involving domestic content 
requirements.27  Indeed, despite claims by India that the dispute could be 
distinguished and a different test should be applied, both the panel and the 
Appellate Body confirmed the applicability of the analysis of Article III that had 
been employed in that previous case.  On this basis, India was found to have 
adopted measures that discriminated in favour of domestic products and it was 
unable to satisfy the exception for laws, regulations or requirements governing 
the procurement of products by governmental agencies.  Whilst this part of the 
decision is relatively straightforward, other parts of the decision are of greater 
interest because of their consideration of two further exceptions to Article III. 
 
Firstly, the Appellate Body considered whether the measures could be justified 
under Article XX(j) of the GATT, which permits measures ‘essential to the 
acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply…’ The 
case is significant because it is the first time that this provision has been 
interpreted by the Appellate Body.28 
 
                                                        
25 WTO Appellate Body, India – Certain Measures relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, 
Document WT/DS456/AB/R (16 September 2016). 
26 [1.3]. 
27 See summary and comment in James Harrison, ‘Significant International Environmental Law 
Cases: 2012-14’ (2014) 26 JEL 519-540. 
28 [5.58]. 
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India had argued that this exception would allow measures aimed at minimizing 
‘risks inherent to the continue dependence on imported solar cells and modules’ 
and to ‘ensure domestic resilience in addressing any supply side disruptions’ 
with a view to ultimately promoting energy security and sustainable 
development.29  Yet, the Appellate Body upheld the panel’s decision to reject this 
defence, in large part because India had failed to identify any actual disruptions 
in supply.30 Furthermore, the Appellate Body confirmed that, even assuming that 
there was a risk of disruption, it did not ‘follow from an increase in domestic 
production capacity that domestic manufacturers will necessarily sell their 
production to domestic buyers, rather than exporting to buyers abroad.’31 Whilst 
the Appellate Body expressed sympathy with the policy objectives of the Indian 
government to promote energy security and ecologically sustainable growth, it 
underlined that such policy considerations ‘do not relieve the responding party 
invoking the exception in Article XX(j) from the burden to demonstrate that 
imported products are not “available” to meet demand and that the products at 
issue are “in general or local short supply.”’32  In light of this finding, it was not 
necessary for the Appellate Body to determine whether the measure was 
‘essential’ for the purposes of Article XX(j), although it did indicate that this 
requirement set a high threshold and it was ‘as least as’ stringent as the necessity 
requirement under paragraphs (a), (b) and (d) of Article XX.33 
 
India had also invoked the exception in Article XX(d) of the GATT, which permits 
measures ‘necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are 
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating 
to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies …, the protection of 
patents, trademarks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices.’ 
In developing its argument under this provision, India had made reference to a 
number of instruments, which it claimed justified the adoption of its measures, 
with a particular focus on the Electricity Act read in conjunction with the 
National Energy Policy, the National Electricity Plan, and the National Action 
Plan on Climate Change. According to India, these instruments laid down a 
requirement of ecologically sustainable growth. Whilst the Appellate Body 
agreed that it was possible to look at these instruments collectively as part of a 
comprehensive framework,34 it emphasized that it was still necessary for India 
to demonstrate that they contained rules that were normative in nature.35 The 
Appellate Body reviewed the different instruments relied upon by India, but it 
did not consider that they set out a ‘rule’ to ensure ecologically sustainable 
growth.36 Rather, the Appellate Body confirmed the finding of the panel that ‘the 
                                                        
29 [5.75]-[5.76] 
30 [5.76]. 
31 [5.74]. 
32 [5.79]. 
33 [5.62]. 
34 [5.111]. 
35 [5.109]. See also [5.111]: ‘insofar as a respondent seeks to rely on a rule deriving from several 
instruments or parts thereof, it would still bear the burden of establishing that the instruments 
or the parts that it identifies actually set out the alleged rules.’ 
36 [5.133]. 
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text of these passages and provisions is “hortatory, aspirational, declaratory, and 
at times solely descriptive.”’37   
 
India also claimed that its measures were further supported by its international 
obligations, which were capable of being implemented at the national level 
through executive action and therefore should be considered as relevant ‘laws or 
regulations’ for the purposes of Article XX(d).  However, the Appellate Body did 
not consider that India had sufficiently demonstrated that any of the 
international instruments relied upon by India, such as the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change38, the Convention on Biological 
Diversity or Agenda 21, were ‘rules that form part of its domestic legal system 
and fall within the scope of “laws or regulations” under Article XX(d).’39  This 
finding relied upon the understanding of the Indian legal system as dualist in 
nature so that these international instruments did not have direct effect in Indian 
law without some implementing act by the legislative or executive branch of 
government.  Thus, India’s defence was rejected and the panel report was 
upheld. 
 
4. Human Rights and the Environment 
 
Human rights courts and tribunals are also commonly called upon to take into 
account environmental considerations in their case law and 2016-17 saw a 
number of new decisions in this regard. The applicant in SC Fiercolect Impex SRL 
v Romania40 ran a scrap iron collection and recycling facility in the Cluj 
Prefecture of Romania.  The facility had an operating permit, which was valid 
until 7 March 2005.  According to the applicable regulations, it was necessary to 
apply for an extension to the permit by 4 January 2005.  Regulations also 
required an application for an environmental permit to be submitted alongside 
the application for the operating permit.  When the applicant applied for the 
environmental permit, he was informed that it could not be processed because 
guidelines relating to the issuing of environmental permits had not yet been 
adopted. As a result, the applicant was not able to obtain either the 
environmental permit or the operating permit for a few months until the 
guidance was issued.  It followed that the facility was operating without the 
necessary permits and the applicant was fined 25,000,000 Romanian Leu and he 
had a further 768,471,700 Romanian Leu confiscated to represent the market 
value of the scrap metal that had been collected for recycling during the period in 
which the facility had been operating illegally.  The applicant brought 
proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights, alleging a violation of 
Article 1 of Protocol 1, which protects the right to property.  The essential 
argument advanced by the applicant was that the failure to obtain a permit 
                                                        
37 ibid. See also [5.136] 
38 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted 9 May 
1992, entered into force 21 March 1994, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1771, 
p. 165. 
39 [5.148]. 
40 SC Fiercolect Impex SRL v Romania, European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Former Third 
Section, App no 26429/07 (13 December 2016). 
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within time was due to the delays caused by the government and therefore he 
should not be held responsible.  
 
The Court noted that Article 1 of Protocol 1 requires a ‘fair balance’ to be struck 
between the general interests of the community and the individual’s 
fundamental rights under the Convention.  This in turn requires a ‘reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought 
to be achieved.’41   This test of proportionality was at the centre of the Court’s 
evaluation of the case. In particular, it noted that ‘in order to be considered 
proportionate, the interference should correspond to the gravity of the 
infringement.’42 In this context, the Court emphasised that:  
 
[I] n today’s society the protection of the environment is an increasingly 
important consideration.  The environment is a cause whose defence 
arouses the constant and sustained interest of the public, and 
consequently the public authorities.  Financial imperatives should not be 
afforded priority over environmental protection considerations, in 
particular when the State has legislated in that regard.  The public 
authorities therefore assume a responsibility which should in practice 
result in their intervention at the appropriate time in order to ensure that 
the statutory provisions enacted with the purpose of protecting the 
environment are not entirely ineffective.43   
 
The Court also underlined that states have a wide margin of appreciation 
concerning measures taken for the protection of the environment.44 On the facts 
of the case, the Court thus found that Romania was justified in its interference 
with the property of the applicant. The Court was of the view that the applicant 
should have suspended its activity until it had obtained permits or else it should 
have asked for further advice from the government on what to do.  It also noted 
that the penalties imposed by the state had been calculated to reflect the profits 
earned during the time in which the facility had operated without a permit and 
they could therefore not be considered as excessive or unrelated to the severity 
of the crime.  The application was thus dismissed.   
 
This case clearly sets a high threshold for a violation to be found on the basis of 
Article 1 of Protocol 1.  Nevertheless, the outcome of such claims will to a large 
extent depend on the facts of the case. In Barcza and others v Hungary,45 the 
applicant’s property had been affected by the establishment of a water 
preservation zone. Owners of such property were precluded from using their 
property in any way that could endanger the quality of the water or otherwise 
cause pollution.  Affected owners were entitled to apply for the state to purchase 
their property if they were unable to use their land in the way that they wished.  
The applicants in this case had requested that their land was expropriated, but 
                                                        
41 [61]. 
42 [64]. 
43 [64]. 
44 [65]. 
45 Barcza and others v Hungary, European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Fourth Section, App no 
50811/10, (11 October 2016). 
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the authorities had taken no action for a number of years.  The Court again 
stressed that a state enjoys a wide margin of appreciation in such matters, but it 
took the view that the delayed reaction of the local authorities, amounting to 
several years, was sufficient to amount to a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1, as 
‘the applicants were left in a state of uncertainty as to the fate of their plot of 
land over a long period of time during which they could neither realistically 
expect to sell their property at a fair price, nor obtain expropriation against 
compensation.’46  The state was therefore ordered to pay compensation. 
                                                        
46 [48]. 
